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224 GILL v. HEARST PuBLISHING Co. [40 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22038. In Bank. Feb. 17, 1953.] 
JOHN W. GILL et al., Appellants, v. HEARST PUBLISH- . 
ING COMPANY, INC. et al., Respondents. 
[1] Appeal-Estoppel or Waiver of Right to Urge Error.-Al-
though plaintiffs in opposing a demurrer to a complaint re-
lating to unauthorized publication of their photograph in 
connection with a magazine article stressed that the photo-
graph alone violated their right of privacy without regard 
to its use in connection with the article, defendants may not, 
on plaintiffs' appeal from a judgment entered on an order 
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, successfully 
urge a waiver by plaintiffs or estoppel in limitation of the 
premise of their alleged damage claim where, regardless of 
plaintiffs' theory of liability, the ruling of the trial court 
would have been the same. 
[2] Pleading-Demurrer-Amendment After Demurrer Sustained. 
-Where a complaint alleges that a photograph was published 
with the knowledge and consent of defendants, but there is 
no allegation that the magazine article which such photograph 
was used to illustrate was published with their consent, such 
defect is capable of being cured by amendment, and it is 
an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer to the complaint 
without leave to amend. 
[3] Privacy-Invasion of Right-Publication of Photograph.-
Mere publication of a photograph depicting man and woman 
in an affectionate pose does not constitute an actionable in-
vasion of their right of privacy. 
[4] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-The right "to be let 
alone" and to be protected from undesired publicity is not 
absolute, but must be balanced against the public interest 
in the dissemination of news and information consistent with 
the democratic processes under the constitutional guaranties 
of freedom of speech and of the press. (U. S. Const., Amends. 
I, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.) 
[5] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-The right of privacy 
may not be extended to prohibit any publication of matter 
which may be of public or general interest, but rather the 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 77; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 298. 
[3] Right of privacy, notes, 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 456; 14 
A.L.R.2d 750. See, also, Cal.Jur., Privacy; Am.Jur., Privacy, 
§ 2 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, §§ 1088, 1089; 
[2] Pleading, § 103(2); [3-12] Privacy. 
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general object in view is to protect the privacy of public life, 
and to whatever degree and in whatever connection a man's 
life has ceased to be private, before the publication under 
consideration has been made, to that extent the protection is 
to be withdrawn. 
[6] !d.-Standard by Which Right is to be Measured.-The right 
of privacy is determined by the norm of the ordinary man; 
to constitute a violation of such right the alleged objection-
able publication must appear offensive in the light of ordinary 
sensibilities. 
[7] !d.-Standard by Which Right is to be Determined.-Liability 
for violation of the right of privacy exists only if defendant's 
conduct was such that he should have realized that it would 
be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities, or if the 
intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency. 
[8] !d.-Standard by Which Right is to be Measured.-Whether 
there has been such an invasion of privacy as to be offensive 
to persons of ordinary sensibilities is to some extent a ques-
tion of law. 
[9] !d.-Invasion of Right--Publication of Photograph.-The con-
stitutional guaranties of freedom of expression apply with 
equal force to publication of a photograph depicting man and 
woman in an affectionate pose, whether such photograph be 
a news report or an entertainment feature, and the pub-
lisher's liability accrues only in the event there has been a 
wrongful invasion of the couple's right of privacy. 
[10] !d.-Waiver or Loss of Right.-Where photograph was taken 
of husband and wife in an affectionate pose voluntarily as-
sumed by them at their market or place of business allegedly 
"well known to persons and travelers throughout the world," 
they by their voluntary action waived their right of privacy 
so far as this particular public pose was assumed, since there 
can be no privacy in that which is already public. 
[11] !d.-Waiver or Loss of Right.-Where husband and wife 
voluntarily posed for a photograph in a public place, their 
right to privacy as to this incident ceased and it in effect 
became a part of the public domain, as to which they cannot 
later rescind their waiver in an attempt to assert a right 
of privacy. 
[12] !d.-Invasion of Right--Publication of Photograph.-Photo-
graph of man and woman sitting romantically close to one 
another in a public place, the man with his arm· around the 
woman, is not so uncomplimentary or discreditable that its 
publication might go beyond the limits of decency and con-
[6] See Am.Jur., Privacy, § 12. 
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stitute a violation of the right of privacy, since such photo-
graph depicts no more than an incident which may be seen 
almost daily in ordinary life. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for invasion of privacy. Judgment 
for defendants after sustaining demurrer to amended com-
plaint without leave to amend, reversed.· 
Shacknove & Goldman and Ben F. Goldman, Jr., for Ap-
pellants. 
Flint & MacKay and Arch R. Tuthill for Respondents. 
Loeb & Loeb; Lawler, Felix & Hall; Price, Ma.cDonald & 
Knox; John Hamlyn ; Cosgrove, Cramer, Diether & Rindge, 
and Binford & Binford as Amici Curiae on behalf of Re-
spondents. 
SPENCE, J.-As in the related case of Girt v. Curtis Pt~b. 
Co., 38 Cal.2d 273 [239 P.2d 630], plaintiffs, husband and 
wife, sought damages for an alleged invasion of their right of 
privacy. Defendants' demurrer to the amended complaint 
was sustained without leave to amend. From the judgment 
accordingly entered, plaintiffs appeal. It appears that plain-
tiffs properly challenge the correctness of the trial court's 
ruling insofar as it foreclosed their right to amend. 
Plaintiffs' original complaint was predicated solely on the 
charge that in the October, 1947, issue of Harper's Bazaar, 
a magazine published and distributed by the corporate de-
fendants, there appeared an unauthorized photograph of 
plaintiffs taken by defendants' employee while plaintiffs were 
seated in an affectionate pose at their place of business, a 
confectionery and ice cream concession in !h'e Farmers' Market 
in Los Angeles. This photograph was used to illustrate an 
article entitled "And So the World Goes Round," a short 
commentary reaffirming "the poet's conviction that the world 
could not revolve without love," despite "vulgarization" of 
the sentiment by some, and that ballads may still be written 
about everyday people in love. A demurrer to that original 
complaint was sustained on the ground that the statute of 
limitations had run, but leave to amend was granted. Plain-
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tiffs do not question the propriety of that ruling. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 340, subd. 3.) 
Plaintiffs thereupon amended their complaint to allege that 
the same photograph was republished with defendants' con-
sent in the May, 1949, issue of the Ladies' Home Journal, 
a monthly magazine published and distributed by the Curtis 
Publishing Company. The same publication was involved in 
Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d 273. Specifically, 
it is here alleged that the "picture" was republished with the 
"knowledge, permission and consent" of defendants and that 
''credit'' for the publication was given to and required by 
defendants; that the published photograph depicts plaintiffs 
in an "uncomplimentary" pose; that plaintiffs' right of 
privacy was thereby invaded and plaintiffs were subjected to 
humiliation and annoyance to their damage in the sum of 
$25,000. While the picture was used for illustration of an 
article entitled "Love" (see Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 
p. 275), plaintiffs did not allege that defendants also con-
sented to the publication of the article. However, a copy of 
the picture, with the accompanying article, is attached as an 
exhibit to the amended complaint. Defendants maintain that 
since plaintiffs failed to make the direct allegation that de-
fendants consented to the publication of the article, plaintiffs' 
alleged cause of action must be deemed to rest solely on the 
publication of the photograph without reference to the ac-
companying text or caption under the picture. 
[1] It is true that in their argument in opposing de-
fendants' demurrer to their amended complaint, plaintiffs 
stressed the publication of the photograph alone as constitut-
ing a violation of their right of priva~yJ without regard to 
its use in connection with the article. However, as appears 
from its memorandum opinion in. sustaining the demurrer 
without leave to amend, the trial court attached no significance 
to the matter of whether plaintiffs charged defendants with 
mere consent to publication of the photograph or included 
also consent to publication of the accompanying article. In 
either event the trial court was of the view that there had 
been no invasion of plaintiffs' right of privae,y. Under such 
circumstances defendants may not successfully urge a waiver 
by plaintiffs or estoppel in limitation of the premise of their 
alleged damage claim. Regardless of plaintiffs' theory of 
liability, the ruling· of the trial court would have been the 
same-that a cause of action had not been stated. 'rherefore 
228 GILL v. HEARST PuBLISHING Co. [40 C.2d 
such authorities as Gorclon v. Kifer, 26 Cal.App.2d 252, 255 
[79 P.2d 164] ; Alberts v. American Casu.aUy Co., 88 Cal.App. 
2d 891, 896 [200 P.2d 37] ; and 2 Cal.Jur. 844-852 are not in 
point. 
[2] As indicated in Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 38 
Cal.2d 273, 279, defendants would be liable in the event of 
their consent to publication of the photograph in connection 
with the article in the Ladies' Home Journal. Plaintiffs 
therefore maintain that any defect in the recitals of the 
amended complaint with reference to defendants' connection 
with the publication of the article as well as the photograph 
could be easily corrected by amendment. The incorporation 
of the article as an exhibit constitutes some basis for an in-
ference that it may have been intended as an inseparable part 
of the photograph in presenting the extent of plaintiffs' com-
plaint. Moreover, the allegation of consent is broad and it 
cannot be said that it necessarily negates a consent to pub-
lishing the article. The objection to plaintiffs' pleading thus 
goes to the matter of effecting a clarification of an uncertainty 
or an ambiguity. Manifestly, such defect is capable of being 
cured by amendment. (Wenner holm v. Stanford University 
School of Medicine, 20 Cal.2d 713, 719 [128 P.2d 522, 141 
A.hR. 1358]; Washer· v. Bank of America, 21 Cal.2d 822, 
833 [136 P.2d 297, 155 A.L.R. 1338].) Under these circum-
stances, the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining 
defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. (Wilk v. 
Vencill, 30 Cal.2d 104, 109 [180 P.2d 351].) 
[3] The recognition of plaintiffs' right to proceed in the 
event of proper clarification involves the further observation 
that mere publication of the photograph standing alone does 
not constitute an actionable invasion of plaintiffs' right of 
privacy. [4] The right "to be let alone" and to be pro-
tected from undesired publicity is not absolute but must be 
balanced against the public interest in the dissemination of 
news and information consistent with the democratic processes 
under the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and 
of the press. (U.S. Const., Amends. I, XIV; Cal. Const. art. I, 
§ 9; 41 Am.Jur., Privacy, § 9, pp. 931-933; Nizer, The Right 
of Pr"ivacy, i\9 Mich.Ij.Rev., 526, 528-529; Gal v. Cnrtis Pub. 
Co., supra, 38 Ca1.2d 273, 277-278.) [5] The right of 
privacy may not be extended to prohibit any publication of 
matter which may be of public or general interest, but rather 
the ''general object in view is to protect the privacy of private 
life, and to whatever degree and in whatever connection a 
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man's life has ceased to be private, before the publication 
under consideration has been made, to that extent the pro-
tection is to be withdrawn.'' ( Br·andeis-Warren Essay, 4 Harv. 
L.Rev., 193, 215; Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. 
App.2d 304, 312 [95 P.2d 491] .) [6] Moreover, the right 
of privacy is determined by the norm of the ordinary man; 
that is to say, the alleged objectionable publication must 
appear offensive in the light of "ordinary sensibilities." 
(41 Am.Jur., Privacy,§ 12, p. 934.) [7] As has been said: 
'' ... liability exists only if the defendant's conduct was 
such that he should have realized 'that it would be offensive 
to persons of ordinary sensibilities. It is only where the 
intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability 
accrues .... It is only when the defendant should know that 
the plaintiff would be justified in feeling seriously hurt by 
the conduct that a cause of action 'exists." (Rest., Torts, Vol. 
4, § 867, comment d, pp. 400-401; see, also, cases collected: 
Annos. 138 A.L.R. 22, 46; 168 A.L.R. 446, 452; 14 A.L.R.2d 
750, 752.) [8] Whether there has been such an offensive 
invasion of privacy is ''to some extent one of law.'' ( 41 Am. 
Jur., Privacy, § 12, p. 935; Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434 
[ 42 N.E. 22, 26, 31 A.hR. 286, 49 Am.St. Rep. 671] ; Reed 
v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 64 Ariz. 294 [162 P.2d 133, 139] ; 
Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198 [20 So.2d 243, 251, 168 A.L.R. 
430] .) 
The picture allegedly was taken at plaintiffs' "place of 
business,'' a confectionery and ice cream concession in the 
Farmers' Market, Los Angeles. It shows plaintiffs, a young 
man and young woman, seated at a counter near a cash 
register, the young woman apparently in intent thought, with 
a notebook and pencil in her hands, which rest on the counter. 
Plaintiffs are dressed informally and are in a romantic pose, 
the young man having one arm about the young woman. 
There are at least five other persons plainly visible in the 
photograph in positions in close proximity to plaintiffs as 
the central figures. Apparently the picture has no particular 
news value but is designed to serve the functioh of entertain-
ment as a matter of legitimate public interest. (Rest., Torts, 
vol. 4, § 867, comments c and d, pp. 399-401.) [9] However, 
the constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression apply 
with equal force to the publication whether it be a news 
report or an entertainment feature (Lovell v. Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444, 452 [58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949]; Winters v. New 
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York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 [68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840] ; United 
States v. Pa.ramonnt Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 [68 
S.Ct. 915,92 L.JiJd. 1260]), and defendants' liability accrues 
only in the event that it can be said that there has been a 
wrongful invasion of plaintiffs' right of privacy. ( Cf. Gill v. 
Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d 273, 280.) 
[10] In considering the nature of the picture in ques-
tion, it is significant that it was not surreptitiously snapped 
on private grounds, but rather was taken of plaintiffs in a 
pose voluntarily assumed in a public market place. So dis-
tinguishable are cases such as Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 
1199 [159 S.W.2d 291], where the picture showed plaintiff 
in her bed at a hospital, which circumstance was held to 
constitute an infringement of the right of privacy. Here 
plaintiffs, photographed at their concession allegedly "well 
known to persons and travelers throughout the world'' as 
conducted for "many years" in the "world-famed" Farm-
ers' Market, had voluntarily exposed themselves to public 
gaze in a pose open to the view of any persons who might 
then be at or near their place of business. By their own 
voluntary action plaintiffs waived their right of privacy so 
far as this particular public pose was asslimed ( 41 Am.Jur., 
Privacy, § 17, p. 937), for "there can be no privacy in that 
which is already public." (Mdvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.App. 
285, 290 [297 P. 91].) The photograph of plaintiffs merely 
permitted other members of the public, who were not at 
plaintiffs' place of business at the time it was taken, to see 
them as they had voluntarily exhibited themselves. [11] Con-
sistent with their own voluntary assumption of this partic-
ular pose in a public place, plaintiffs' right to privacy as 
to this photographed incident ceased and it in effect became 
a part of the public domain (Brandeis-Warren Essay, 4 Harv. 
L.Rev. 193, 218; ivielvin v. Reid, supra, 112 Cal.App. 285, 
290-291), as to which they could not later rescind their 
waiver in an attempt to assert a right of privacy. (Cohen 
v. Marx, 94 Cal.App.2d 704, 705 [211 P.2d 320] .) In short, 
the photograph did not disclose anything which until then 
had been private, but rather only extended knowledge of the 
particular incident to a somewhat larger public than had 
actually witnessed it at the time of occurrence. 
[12] Nor does there appear to be anything "uncompli-
mentary" or discreditable in the photograph itself, so that 
its publication might be objectionable as going "beyond the 
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limits of decency" and reasonably indicate defendants' con-
duct to be such that they ''should have realized it would be 
offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities." (Rest. Torts, 
vol. 4, § 867, comment d, pp. 400-401.) Here the picture of 
plaintiffs, sitting romantically close to one another, the man 
with his arm around the woman, depicts no more than a por-
trayal of an incident which may be seen almost daily in 
ordinary life-couples in a sentimental mood on public park 
benches, in railroad depots or hotel lobbies, at public games, 
the beaches, the theatres. Such situation is readily distin-
guishable from cases where the right of privacy has been 
enforced with regard to the publication of a picture which 
was shocking, revolting or ind,ecent in its portrayal of the 
human body. (See Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506 [149 S.W. 
849, 42 L.R.A.N.S. 386, Ann.Cas. 1914B 374]; Bazemore v. 
Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257 [155 S.E. 194].) In fact, 
here the photograph may very well be said to be compli-
mentary and pleasing in its pictorial representation of plain-
tiffs. 
Plaintiffs have failed to cite, and independent research 
has failed to reveal, any case where the publication of a 
mere photograph under the circumstances here prevailing 
-a picture (1) taken in a pose voluntarily assumed in a 
public place and (2) portraying nothing to shock the ordinary 
sense of decency or propriety-has been held an actionable 
invasion of the right of privacy. To so hold would mean 
that plaintiffs ''under all conceivable circumstances had an 
absolute legal right to [prevent publication of] any photo-
graph of them taken without their consent. If every person 
has such a right, no [periodical] could lawfully publish a 
photograph of a parade or a street scene. We are not pre-
pared to sustain the assertion of such a right.'' ( Themo v. 
New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54 [27 N.E.2d 
753, 755] ; see Rest., Torts, vol. 4, § 867, comment c, pp. 399-
400.) In so concluding, it must be remembered that there 
is no contention here that the publication of plaintiffs' photo-
graph was for advertising or trade purposes. ( 41 Am.Jur., 
Privacy, § 22, p. 941; e.g. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. 
Co., 122 Ga. 190 [50 S.E. 68, 106 Am.St.Rep. 104, 2 Ann. 
Cas. 561, 69 L.R.A. 101}; Kunz v Allen, 102 Kans. 883 [172 
P. 532, L.R.A. 1918D 1151] ; also 26 So.Cal.L.Rev. 102, 103.) 
As heretofore indicated, however, we conclude that plain-
tiffs should have been accorded the right to amend their com-
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plaint, and that the trial court abused its discretion in sus-
taining defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in that part of the majority de-
cision which reverses the judgment for refusal of the trial 
court to allow plaintiffs to amend. I dissent, however, from 
the holding that the publication of the photograph alone 
did not violate plaintiffs' right of privacy. 
It is difficult to ascertain upon what ground the majority 
opinion rests as will hereafter appear. As outlined in Gill 
v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal.2d 273 [239 P.2d 630], and au-
thorities there cited, there are two main questions involved 
in right of privacy cases : ( 1) Is the publication of a char-
acter which would offend the feelings and sensibilities of the 
ordinary person; and (2) if it does so offend, is there such 
a public interest in the subject matter of the publication 
with reference to its news or educational significance that 
it may be published with impunity. In the first instance the 
question is whether there has been any tort (violation of the 
right of privacy) committed, and in the second, having found 
the tort, is it privileged. 
Referring to the second question first, it should be quite 
obvious that there is no news or educational value whatsoever 
in the photograph alone. It depicts two persons (plaintiffs) 
in an amorous pose. There is nothing to show whether they 
are or are not married. While some remote news significance 
might be attached to persons in such a pose on the theory 
that the public likes and is entitled to see persons in such 
a pose, there is no reason why the publisher need invade the 
privacy of John and Jane Doe for his purpose. He can 
employ models for that purpose and the portion of the public 
interested will never know the difference but its maudlin 
curiosity will be appeased. 
For the same reasons the discussion in the majority opinion 
to the effect that plaintiffs consented to the publication be-
cause they assumed the pose in a public place is fallacious. 
But in addition, such a theory is completely at odds with 
the violation of the right of privacy. By plaintiffs' doing 
what they did in view of a tiny fraction of the public, does 
not mean that they consented to observation by the millions 
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of readers of the defendant's magazine. In effect, the ma-
jority holding means that anything anyone does outside of 
his own home is with consent to the publication thereof, be-
cause, under those circumstances he waives his right of pri-
vacy even though there is no news value in the event. If 
such were the case, the blameless exposure of a portion of 
the naked body of a man or woman in a public place as the 
result of inefficient buttons, hooks or other clothes-holding 
devices could be freely photographed and widely published 
with complete immunity. The majority opinion confuses the 
situation, as have some of the other cases, with the question 
of newsworthiness. It has been said that when a person is 
involved in either a public or private event, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, of news value, he has waived his right of 
privacy. Plainly such is not the case where the event 
is involuntary such as the victim of a holdup. As we said 
in Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d 273, 281: "It 
should be observed, that referring to the use of a person's 
likeness for a legitimate public interest as not actionable 
because it indicates a waiver by the person of his right, is 
of doubtful validity, for it has been applied whether the 
publication having news value arose out of an incident of 
his own making or involuntarily and without his fault thrust 
upon him." There is no basis for the conclusion that the 
second a person leaves the portals of his home he consents 
to have his photograph taken under all circumstances there-
after. There being no legitimate public interest, there is no 
excuse for the publication. 
The first ground, that the picture would not offend the 
senses of an ordinary person, is equally untenable. It is 
alleged in plaintiffs' complaint, and admitted by the demurrer 
that it so offended them. It is then a matter of proof at 
the trial. Certainly reasonable men could view the picture 
as showing plaintiffs in a sultry or sensual pose. For this 
court to say as a matter of law that such portrayal would not 
seriously offend the feelings of an ordinary man is to take 
an extreme view, to say the least. The question is one for 
the trier of fact. (Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., supra, 38 Cal.2d 
273, 280.) If it is in part a question of law it is so only 
. to the extent that the rig·ht does not extend to '' supersensi-
tiveness or agoraphobia." (41 Am.Jur., Privacy, § 12.) An 
examination of the photograph shows that it would offend the 
feelings of persons other than oversensitive ones. 
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Finally, adding to the confusion of the precise ground upon 
which it rests, the majority opinion makes point of the fact 
that the picture was not used for advertising purposes, and 
that if it did not hold as it does, there would be liability for 
a person's picture appearing among others in a parade. Ob-
viously the first has no bearing upon whether an ordinary 
man would be offended. The offense would exist or not exist 
regardless of whether it was used for advertising. The second 
adds nothing because the parade and those engaging in it 
are matters of public interest and the persons engaging therein 
are intentionally placing themselves on public display-
parade. 
In announcing a rule of law defining the right of a private 
citizen to be left alone, and not have his photograph published 
to the four winds, especially when he is depicted in an un-
complimentary pose, courts should consider the effect of such 
publication upon the sensibility of the ordinary private citi-
zen, and not upon the sensibility of those persons who seek 
and enjoy publicity and notoriety and seeing their pictures 
on public display, or those who are in the "public eye" 
such as public officials, clergymen, lecturers, actors and others 
whose professional careers bring them in constant contact 
with the public and in whom the public or some segment 
thereof is interested. Obviously anything the latter group 
may do or say has news or educational value-such cannot 
be said of the persons engaged in private business or em-
ployment who constitute more than 90 per cent of our popu-
lation. These private citizens, who desire to be left alone, 
should have and enjoy a right of privacy so long as they 
do nothing which can reasonably be said to have news value. 
Certainly this right is entitled to protection. It seems to 
me that the law should be so molded as to protect the right 
of the 90 per cent who do not desire publicity or notoriety 
and who may be offended by publications such as that here 
involved. And, when the right of privacy of such a person 
is violated, and redress is sought in the courts for the in-
dignity suffered, the courts should apply the general rules 
applicable to the redress of wrongs and submit the issues of 
fact to a jury when demanded. But the majority of this 
court, following its present trend, has again seen fit to deny 
plaintiffs their constitutional right to a jury trial on the 
issues of fact here presented by arrogating to itself both the 
fact-finding and lawmaking power. To this holding I most 
emphatically dissent. 
